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THE MOONSCAPE OF TAX EQUALITY: WINDSOR 
AND BEYOND 
Anthony C. Infanti* 
INTRODUCTION 
From a distance, the moon appears bright, shiny, and attractive. It is 
revered and romanticized. Lives (and deaths) are planned around its phases 
and cycles. But, upon closer inspection, this attractive object is actually 
scarred—pocked with craters left by past violent impacts. For same-sex 
couples, federal tax equality shares a strikingly similar duality. 
In its eagerly anticipated decision in United States v. Windsor, the U.S. 
Supreme Court invalidated Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA) in a suit where a surviving same-sex spouse sought a refund 
of federal estate taxes.1 Before its demise, DOMA purported to defend 
against the onslaught of same-sex couples seeking to destroy “traditional” 
marriage.2 Departing from the federal government’s long tradition of 
deferring to state law on questions of marital status, DOMA denied federal 
recognition to same-sex marriages recognized under state law.3 In Windsor, 
DOMA operated to “protect” traditional marriage by forcing an estate to 
pay $363,053 of federal estate tax on a transfer of property to the (female) 
decedent’s (female) spouse, when the decedent’s estate would have owed 
nothing had the transfer been to the (female) decedent’s (male) spouse.4 
With DOMA now relegated to the constitutional dustbin, it would seem that 
all married couples—regardless of gender and sexual orientation—are on an 
equal legal plane (at least from the perspective of federal law). 
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1
  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. 
§ 7 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
2
  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2–3 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906–07 
(describing “the orchestrated legal assault being waged against traditional heterosexual marriage by gay 
rights groups and their lawyers”). 
3
  See Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981) (“We agree with the government’s 
argument that under the Internal Revenue Code a federal court is bound by state law rather than federal 
law when attempting to construe marital status.”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2–3, reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2906–07. 
4
  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
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In the abstract, invalidating DOMA and its unequal treatment of 
married couples based on their gender and sexual orientation is appealing. 
Like the moon, it draws us in with its own romanticized sort of beauty. But 
when we come face to face with legal equality, we may find that it is not so 
bright, shiny, and attractive. What we will learn is that federal tax equality 
is pocked and scarred by the impact of past legal battles that make it less 
promising and attractive. Indeed, we will find that “equality” is decidedly 
not equal, and that the federal tax situation post-Windsor may be markedly 
worse than pre-Windsor. 
In Part I of this Essay, I describe the path that led to the decision in 
Windsor. Then, in Part II, I turn to describing the ways in which the post-
Windsor tax terrain may actually be worse for same-sex couples than the 
bleak tax landscape they faced before that decision. This is important 
because, while other federal laws will apply to some couples some of the 
time, the federal tax laws are a concern for all of us on an annual (or even 
more frequent) basis. Under DOMA, same-sex couples already faced a 
debilitating level of uncertainty in determining how the federal tax laws 
applied to their relationships. Post-Windsor, same-sex couples will see this 
uncertainty multiply—even after receiving guidance from the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) on the implementation of the Windsor decision in 
the federal tax context. They will have to grapple not only with lingering 
questions surrounding the federal tax treatment of relationships that are not 
recognized, but also with new questions regarding whether and how their 
relationships will be recognized for federal tax purposes. Moreover, it 
seems that dispatching discrimination designed to erode the progress of 
same-sex couples toward formal equality has served only to entrench the 
privileged status of marriage in our federal tax laws rather than to foster the 
recognition of a broader array of human relationships. This Essay ends with 
brief concluding remarks. 
I. EQUALITY ARRIVED 
From 1996 until 2013, Section 3 of DOMA provided that, for purposes 
of federal law, “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers 
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”5 The effect 
of this provision was to deny same-sex couples the important tax benefits 
(and to spare them the tax detriments) that accompany marriage. Following 
its enactment, DOMA was the subject of legal challenges, the earliest of 
which found that the statute passed constitutional muster.6 The 
constitutional tide began to turn, however, in the late 2000s. Unsurprisingly, 
 
5
  Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a). 
6
  See Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wash. 2004). 
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a number of these decisions centered specifically on DOMA’s application 
to the federal tax laws. 
Starting in 2010, the federal court decisions invalidating Section 3 of 
DOMA began to accumulate. First, in Gill v. Office of Personnel 
Management,7 a U.S. district court found “that ‘there exists no fairly 
conceivable set of facts that could ground a rational relationship’ between 
DOMA and a legitimate government objective.”8 Gill involved an equal 
protection challenge to DOMA’s denial of a number of federal benefits 
(including federal income tax benefits) to a group of same-sex couples. In 
that case, the court found that DOMA “violate[d] core constitutional 
principles of equal protection”9 and that all of the proffered rationales for 
enacting DOMA were implausible.10 According to the court, the only 
plausible explanation was that DOMA was borne of “irrational prejudice” 
and “animus” toward same-sex couples.11 
In 2012, three additional district courts invalidated DOMA, and a 
federal appellate court did so for the first time. In Dragovich v. U.S. 
Department of the Treasury,12 a group of California public employees 
challenged the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA and its interaction 
with I.R.C. § 7702B(f). These laws prevented the employees’ same-sex 
spouses and registered domestic partners from enrolling in the state’s long-
term care plan, which is afforded favorable federal tax treatment. The U.S. 
district court found that neither DOMA nor § 7702B(f) bore any rational 
relationship to a legitimate government interest. To the contrary, the court 
found that both statutes were motivated by actual or apparent antigay 
animus.13 Accordingly, the court held that both statutes violated the 
plaintiffs’ equal protection rights.14 In Pedersen v. Office of Personnel 
Management,15 another U.S. district court considered a challenge similar to 
that in Gill. Although the Pedersen court determined that sexual orientation 
classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny, it concluded that 
Section 3 of DOMA could not survive even rational basis review.16 In 
Windsor v. United States,17 another U.S. district court found that Section 3 
of DOMA violated the equal protection rights of a surviving same-sex 
 
7
  699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013). 
8
  Id. at 387 (footnote omitted) (quoting Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
9
  Id. 
10
  See id. at 396. 
11
  Id. at 396–97. 
12
  872 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
13
  Id. at 955. 
14
  Id. at 959, 964. 
15
  881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012). 
16
  Id. at 334. 
17
  833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. United States 
v. Windsor 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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spouse when the surviving spouse had been required to bear the burden of 
federal estate taxes because she was unable to qualify for the estate tax 
marital deduction.18 
In May 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed 
the Gill decision, issuing the first ruling from a federal appellate court 
finding Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional. In its decision, the First 
Circuit was diffident, asserting that DOMA would actually survive the 
traditional rational basis test because “Congress could rationally have 
believed that DOMA would reduce costs, even if newer studies of the actual 
economic effects of DOMA suggest that it may in fact raise costs for the 
federal government.”19 Ultimately, however, the First Circuit decided that 
“the extreme deference accorded to ordinary economic legislation” was 
inappropriate in light of the federalism concerns raised by DOMA’s 
intrusion “on matters customarily within state control.”20 Accordingly, the 
court instead applied a more searching form of rational basis scrutiny, as 
had been done in other cases where a classification targets a “historically 
disadvantaged or unpopular” group.21 Disavowing any reliance upon 
antigay animus as a basis for its decision, the First Circuit held that DOMA 
could not pass muster under this more searching form of rational basis 
scrutiny, stating that “[s]everal of the reasons given [in support of DOMA] 
do not match the statute and several others are diminished by specific 
holdings in Supreme Court decisions more or less directly on point.”22 
Just seven months later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear an 
appeal in Windsor.23 On June 26, 2013, a sharply divided Supreme Court 
issued a decision in that case invalidating Section 3 of DOMA.24 In the 
majority opinion, the Windsor Court elided the question of the appropriate 
standard of review under equal protection analysis; however, it did seem to 
apply something more than traditional rational basis review to the 
taxpayer’s claim.25 In reaching its decision, the majority drew upon 
federalism concerns—given that questions of marital status have 
historically been left to the states—but relied more directly upon the antigay 
animus underlying DOMA’s enactment.26 Ultimately, the Court held that 
 
18
  Id. at 396; see also I.R.C. § 2056 (2006). 
19
  Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013). 
20
  Id. at 11, 13. 
21
  Id. at 10–11. 
22
  Id. at 15. 
23
  Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, cert granted, 133 S. Ct. 768 (2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
24
  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
25
  See id. at 2693 (subjecting DOMA to “careful consideration”); see also id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (observing that the majority “does not apply anything that resembles th[e] deferential 
framework” of rational basis analysis). 
26
  Id. at 2689–96 (majority opinion). 
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Section 3 of DOMA “is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the 
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its 
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”27 
II. NOT SO EQUAL AFTER ALL 
In the absence of Section 3 of DOMA, the question of whether same-
sex couples are considered married for federal tax purposes is determined 
by reference to state law. Thus, same-sex couples are now ostensibly on the 
same legal footing as different-sex couples for purposes of federal tax law. 
In reality, however, invalidating Section 3 of DOMA does not, by itself, 
bring about tax equality in any meaningful sense. Nor does it merely return 
same-sex couples to the status quo of blanket discrimination that preceded 
the enactment of DOMA. Instead, because of the pocks and scars left by 
legal battles that took place in the shadow of DOMA, invalidating Section 3 
of DOMA will likely worsen the legal position of same-sex couples and 
further entrench the privileging of marriage in the federal tax laws. 
A. A Shifted and Shifting Legal Landscape 
Fearing that the Hawaii courts were poised to legally recognize same-
sex marriages, Congress was motivated to codify what was then the norm of 
denying legal recognition to same-sex relationships.28 In other words, 
Congress’s enactment of Section 3 of DOMA merely substituted a single 
federal rule denying legal recognition to same-sex relationships for fifty 
state rules that had previously had the same effect. Accordingly, from the 
perspective of same-sex couples, Section 3 of DOMA had no immediate 
impact on how they were treated under federal law—they were treated the 
same the day after Congress enacted DOMA as they had been the day 
before. 
The legal landscape at the state level did change for same-sex couples, 
but not as quickly or in the way that Congress had envisioned. It was not 
until 1999, when Vermont created the first “civil union” regime in the 
United States,29 that the first state extended all of the rights and obligations 
of marriage to same-sex couples. And it was not until 2003 that 
Massachusetts became the first state to extend the right to marry to same-
sex couples.30 Since then, same-sex couples have experienced significant 
advances in obtaining legal recognition for their relationships. 
At the time of this Essay’s publication, the District of Columbia and 
thirteen states (i.e., California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, 
 
27
  Id. at 2696. 
28
  H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2914.  
29
  Act Relating to Civil Unions, § 3, 2000 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 91 (LexisNexis). 
30
  Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Washington) permit same-sex couples to marry.31 Five 
other states (i.e., Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, and Oregon) do not 
permit same-sex marriages, but do permit same-sex couples to enter into 
legally equivalent relationships.32 Two states (i.e., Colorado and Wisconsin) 
only permit same-sex couples to enter into legal relationships that afford 
something less than all of the rights and obligations of marriage.33 In 
contrast, thirty-five states have a constitutional or statutory prohibition 
against same-sex marriage.34 Interestingly, among the states that prohibit 
same-sex marriage, only twenty-nine afford no legal recognition to same-
sex relationships.35 The other six states actually do legally recognize same-
sex relationships—four of them have civil union or domestic partnership 
regimes that withhold nothing from same-sex couples other than the 
marriage label, and the other two permit same-sex couples to enter into 
relationships with lesser rights and obligations. 
Now forced to abandon its uniform federal definition of (non)marriage 
for same-sex couples, the federal government will not simply return to 
relying upon a uniform set of state rules that will have the same effect. 
Instead, invalidating Section 3 of DOMA will cause the federal government 
to embrace a significantly changed legal landscape for purposes of 
determining who is (or is not) married for federal tax purposes. This legal 
landscape is not only far different from the one that existed in 1996 but also 
a complex and ever-shifting one. 
The shifting landscape is largely a product of federalism and its 
supposed incarnation in Section 2 of DOMA. Section 2 of DOMA purports 
to authorize states to refuse legal recognition to same-sex marriages validly 
contracted in other states.36 The ostensible purpose of this provision is to 
permit each state to make the decision whether to legally recognize same-
sex relationships, without having to give effect to another state’s choice 
regarding this question.37 The practical impact of this provision is to cause 
 
31
  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND OTHER RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION 
LAWS (2013), available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/marriage_equality_082013.pdf. 
32
  Id. 
33
  Id. Colorado has enacted a civil union regime that purports to afford same-sex couples all of the 
rights and obligations of marriage. S. 13-011, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013) (enacting 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-15-107). However, this law specifically withheld from same-sex couples the 
right to file joint state income tax returns on the ground that Colorado’s income tax incorporates the 
federal income tax by reference, at the time of the regime’s enactment, and same-sex couples were not 
permitted to file joint federal income tax returns. Id. § 14-15-117. 
34
  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS (2013), available at 
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/marriage_prohibitions_072013.pdf. 
35
  Compare id., with HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND OTHER RELATIONSHIP 
RECOGNITION LAWS, supra note 31. 
36
  See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
37
  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 6–10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2910–14. 
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the legal recognition of same-sex relationships to appear and disappear as 
couples cross state borders. For example, a same-sex couple married in 
Massachusetts will see the legal recognition of their relationship disappear 
when they visit Pennsylvania or enter into a transaction in Ohio because 
those states refuse to legally recognize same-sex relationships.38 Even 
among the states that legally recognize same-sex relationships, it is not 
clear that the Massachusetts couple’s marriage would be honored. For 
instance, Nevada and Oregon may recognize the couple’s relationship as a 
domestic partnership (but not as a marriage); however, it appears that the 
couple would have to separately register as domestic partners in those states 
before their relationship would be recognized.39 In contrast, a different-sex 
couple married in Massachusetts would not encounter any uncertainty 
regarding the recognition of their relationship because their relationship 
would be recognized in every state as a routine matter.40 
B. Uncertainty, Uncertainty, and More Uncertainty 
1. Uncertainty Pre-Windsor.—Even under DOMA’s ostensibly 
simple rule of legal nonrecognition, same-sex couples faced debilitating 
uncertainty regarding the application of the federal tax laws to their 
relationships. Decreeing that same-sex couples were not married for federal 
tax purposes answered many simple questions—for example, same-sex 
couples could not file joint federal income tax returns41 or benefit from the 
rules that shield property transfers between spouses from tax.42 But DOMA 
did nothing to tell same-sex couples how the tax laws applied to their 
relationships in more ambiguous circumstances. For instance, same-sex 
couples with unequal earnings who commingled their finances were given 
no guidance on how to treat the transfer that effectively took place each 
year from the higher-earning spouse to the lower-earning spouse. Yet this is 
just the type of entanglement and commitment that would be expected of 
couples and that has been relied upon to make marital status a factor in 
 
38
  OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (2010). 
39
  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122A.500 (LexisNexis 2010); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (prohibiting the 
legal recognition of same-sex marriages); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.300–.340 (2011) (establishing a 
domestic partnership regime but containing no provision regarding the recognition of out-of-state legal 
relationships as domestic partnerships); BASIC RIGHTS OR., DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP RESOURCE GUIDE 
4 (2007) (advising same-sex couples to register as domestic partners in Oregon, even if they have 
obtained a domestic partnership or civil union in another state), available at 
http://www.basicrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/BRO-Domestic-Partnership-Resource-Guide-
2008.pdf. 
40
  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 283–84 (1971). 
41
  I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2006). 
42
  Id. §§ 1041, 2056, 2523. 
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determining tax consequences.43 The courts and the IRS did little to fill this 
gap.44 Indeed, in 2010, the National Taxpayer Advocate “sharply criticized 
the IRS for failing to provide generally applicable, precedential guidance to 
same-sex couples concerning the application of the federal tax laws to 
them.”45 
Returning to a derivative definition of marriage for federal tax 
purposes promises only to multiply the debilitating tax uncertainty that 
accompanied DOMA. Now, in addition to figuring out how to apply the tax 
laws to their relationships when they are not recognized, same-sex couples 
will have to figure out when their relationships will be recognized for 
federal tax purposes. The question of who is married—and when—arises 
because of the interaction of (1) the patchwork of state recognition of same-
sex relationships with (2) the less-than-clear rules for determining a 
couple’s marital status.46 Justice Scalia was, therefore, absolutely correct 
when he pointed out in his dissent in Windsor that striking down DOMA 
raises “difficult choice-of-law issues.”47 
2. Uncertainty Post-Windsor.—In the wake of Windsor, President 
Obama “directed his administration to find ways to make sure gay couples 
 
43
  For a fuller explanation of the uncertainties faced by same-sex couples under DOMA, see 
Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on 
Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407, 423–36 (2008). 
44
  Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Taxpayers: A Collision of “Others,” 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 18–20 
(2012). 
45
  Id. at 19; see also 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., I.R.S., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2012 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 450 (2012) (indicating that, since the issuance of its 2010 report 
containing this criticism, “the IRS has published guidance for relatively discrete populations” of same-
sex couples). 
46
  In the absence of controlling rules in the Internal Revenue Code or Treasury Regulations, the 
courts and the IRS have articulated a number of different standards for determining choice of law 
questions regarding marital status. Many courts have stated that the law of the couple’s domicile 
controls. See, e.g., Boyer v. Comm’r, 732 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Other courts have referred to 
the legally distinct concept of the taxpayer’s residence in determining which state’s law controls. See, 
e.g., Peveler v. Comm’r, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 79,460 (1979). Yet other authorities have disregarded the 
current state of residence or domicile and have looked to the law of the state where the marriage was 
entered into. See, e.g., Chagra v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 91,366, at 91-1839 n.3 (1991); Rev. Rul. 
58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60. In the context of determining whether a marriage has ended (and a new one has 
begun) and whether a couple could file a joint return, the IRS has respected one state’s waiving of 
another state’s waiting period for remarriage following a divorce. Rev. Rul. 29, 1953-1 C.B. 67. In 
addition, some courts have honored a divorce granted by a state other than the state of marital domicile, 
notwithstanding that a court in the state of marital domicile had ruled that the divorce was invalid. E.g., 
Feinberg v. Comm’r, 198 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 1952). For married different-sex couples, many of the 
difficult issues that same-sex couples will now face have likely been elided because of the easy 
portability of a different-sex couple’s marital status throughout the United States. See supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion of the IRS’s position on this question with respect to same-sex 
marriages, see infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
47
  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2708 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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receive[] the benefits for which they [a]re now eligible.”48 Just two months 
later, the IRS issued its first guidance implementing the Windsor decision. 
Under that guidance, the IRS will recognize “a marriage of same-sex 
individuals that was validly entered into in a state whose laws authorize the 
marriage of two individuals of the same sex even if the married couple is 
domiciled in a state that does not recognize the validity of same-sex 
marriages.”49 The IRS chose this rule to avoid the difficult questions that 
would arise if marital status were determined based on the taxpayer’s 
domicile, with marriages possibly appearing and disappearing each time a 
taxpayer moves.50 According to the Secretary of the Treasury, this “ruling 
provides certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing guidance for all legally 
married same-sex couples nationwide.”51 Upon closer inspection, however, 
this ruling provides no more than the same veneer of clarity that DOMA 
did, as it leaves important questions unanswered, lays traps for the unwary, 
creates inequities, and entails unfortunate (and, hopefully, unintended) 
consequences. 
a. Evasive marriages.—At different points in its guidance, the 
IRS speaks of recognizing the marriages of same-sex couples who are 
“lawfully married” or a marriage that was “valid in the state where it was 
entered into.”52 This raises a question regarding what the IRS means when it 
refers to “valid” or “lawful” marriages. Will the IRS require only that the 
couple have observed the legal formalities imposed by the state of 
celebration? Or does the IRS have a broader notion of validity in mind? 
In its guidance, the IRS seems to address only the situation faced by 
couples in so-called migratory marriages. In other words, the IRS seems to 
focus on couples who are domiciled in a state that recognizes same-sex 
marriage, who marry in that state, and who later move to a state that refuses 
to recognize their marriage: 
 Under this rule, individuals of the same sex will be considered to be 
lawfully married under the Code as long as they were married in a state whose 
laws authorize the marriage of two individuals of the same sex, even if they 
are domiciled in a state that does not recognize the validity of same-sex 
marriages. For over half a century, for Federal income tax purposes, the 
Service has recognized marriages based on the laws of the state in which they 
were entered into, without regard to subsequent changes in domicile, to 
achieve uniformity, stability, and efficiency in the application and 
administration of the Code. Given our increasingly mobile society, it is 
 
48
  Michael D. Shear, Obama, in Africa, Praises U.S. Ruling on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/world/africa/obama-in-africa.html. 
49
  Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. 
50
  See id. 
51
  Annie Lowrey, IRS to Recognize Gay Couples, Regardless of State Measures, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Aug. 30, 2013, at A-6. 
52
  Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. 
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important to have a uniform rule of recognition that can be applied with 
certainty by the Service and taxpayers alike for all Federal tax purposes. Those 
overriding tax administration policy goals generally apply with equal force in 
the context of same-sex marriages.53 
This passage makes it clear that the status of migratory couples will not 
change merely by reason of a change of domicile. The paragraphs that 
immediately follow this passage reinforce the impression that the IRS only 
had migratory marriages in mind when it drafted the revenue ruling, as 
these paragraphs focus exclusively on the advantages of a uniform approach 
when couples change their domicile by moving from state to state.54 
But what about couples who enter into so-called evasive marriages? 
An evasive marriage occurs when a couple domiciled in a state that does 
not recognize same-sex marriage travels to another state to marry and 
immediately returns to their state of domicile to live. For instance, a 
Pennsylvania same-sex couple might travel to New York to marry and then 
return to Pennsylvania to live as a couple. Regarding the validity of this 
marriage, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that “[a] 
marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage 
was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the 
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant 
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.”55 
A court applying the Restatement (as Pennsylvania has done in the past) 
could invalidate this evasive marriage because the couple’s state of 
domicile (i.e., Pennsylvania) has a strong public policy against same-sex 
marriage.56 
Are the many same-sex couples in evasive marriages now considered 
“married” for federal tax purposes?57 The IRS guidance does not even 
 
53
  Id. (emphasis added). 
54
  Id. 
55
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (emphasis added). 
56
  23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2013) (“It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding 
public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one woman. A 
marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign 
jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) cmt. k (“To date . . . a marriage has only been invalidated 
when it violated a strong policy of a state where at least one of the spouses was domiciled at the time of 
the marriage and where both made their home immediately thereafter.”); see In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 
A.2d 255, 258–59 (Pa. 1974) (applying the Restatement in determining whether an evasive marriage to a 
paramour should be recognized for inheritance-tax purposes). 
57
  And if these marriages are invalid, could the IRS treat these same-sex couples as married for 
federal tax purposes even if it wished to? Where does the IRS derive the authority to recognize 
marriages that are invalid; that is, that are not really marriages at all under state law? This would 
certainly go well beyond the IRS’s authority to interpret the Internal Revenue Code because it would put 
the IRS in the position of establishing its own rules for marriage. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006). 
Furthermore, it seems logically inconsistent for the IRS, on the one hand, to legally recognize the 
relationships of couples who have made a legally ineffectual commitment to each other (but who have 
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acknowledge—much less address—this category of marriages. Is it enough 
that these couples satisfied the legal formalities imposed by the state where 
they were married? Or, as the IRS guidance seems to say, are they now 
compelled to obtain expensive legal opinions regarding the validity of their 
marriages prior to filing their tax returns or even reporting to their 
employers that they are married (so that their fringe benefits are 
appropriately treated for tax purposes)? What if a same-sex couple cannot 
afford a legal opinion? Do they risk penalties if the position they take on 
their tax return proves to be incorrect?58 
Even if evasive marriages are recognized, that will have the effect of 
drawing a line between the haves and have-nots. In other words, it would 
create a legal distinction between two classes of same-sex couples residing 
in the same state: those who can afford to travel to, and marry in, another 
state that recognizes same-sex marriage and those who cannot afford to do 
so. In an unfortunate intersection of class with marital status, the federal tax 
treatment of same-sex couples would then turn on whether a couple is 
wealthy enough to travel across state lines to marry. 
b. Continued relevance of state law.—Notwithstanding the 
claim that the IRS guidance is “clear” and “coherent” and provides 
“certainty,”59 there are many tax questions that it does not raise or answer. 
The IRS guidance only provides the rule for determining marital status 
where the Internal Revenue Code directly makes marriage relevant to the 
determination of tax consequences. As stated in the guidance, “[f]or Federal 
tax purposes, the terms ‘spouse,’ ‘husband and wife,’ ‘husband,’ and ‘wife’ 
include an individual married to a person of the same sex if the individuals 
are lawfully married under state law, and the term ‘marriage’ includes such 
a marriage between individuals of the same sex.”60 There are, however, 
many instances in which marital status is relevant to the determination of 
federal tax consequences only indirectly through the application of state 
law. The IRS guidance does not address these situations, and, in the absence 
of a federal rule, state law will control. But which state’s law? 
For example, the existence of a parent–child relationship can be 
relevant to determining the federal tax treatment of both the parent and the 
child. The existence of parent–child relationships, which often turn on the 
 
nonetheless managed to obtain a piece of paper from a state with the word marriage on it) and, on the 
other hand, to refuse to legally recognize the relationships of the many couples who have made the same 
commitment in a fashion that actually affords them all of the legal rights and obligations of marriage 
(but who have only managed to obtain a piece of paper from the state with the words civil union or 
domestic partnership on it). See infra Part II.B.2.d. 
58
  See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1), (c) (applying a penalty for “[n]egligence or disregard of rules or 
regulations”). Taxpayers may avoid the penalty if they can demonstrate reasonable cause for their 
underpayment of tax and that they acted in good faith. Id. § 6664(c). 
59  
Lowrey, supra note 51.  
60
  Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. 
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marital status of the parents, will continue to be determined under state law. 
Under the IRS guidance, a same-sex couple living in a state that recognizes 
same-sex marriage, who marry there, and who later move to a state that 
refuses to recognize their marriage will continue to be treated as married for 
federal tax purposes. If this couple has one or more children after the move, 
which state’s law will determine parentage? The choice of law can be 
important because the state of the marriage’s celebration might have treated 
both spouses as parents of the child automatically,61 but the new state—one 
that refuses to recognize the couple’s relationship—might provide no means 
for establishing a legal relationship between the child and the nonbiological 
parent.62 
Will such a child be a “qualifying child” of the nonbiological parent 
for federal tax purposes? Will the child be considered related to the 
nonbiological parent for purposes of rules attributing ownership from 
parents to children (or vice versa)?63 What if the nonbiological parent passes 
away and neither the spouse nor the child are to receive any of the 
decedent’s property under a will or intestate succession, but a relative who 
is to receive the property wishes to disclaim in favor of the surviving spouse 
or child and to transfer the property directly to them? Will that be an 
effective disclaimer for federal estate and gift tax purposes if the property 
would have passed to the surviving spouse or child under the laws of the 
state of the marriage’s celebration but not under the law of the state of the 
decedent’s domicile?64 
The IRS guidance does not address how far it will apply the law of the 
state of a marriage’s celebration for federal tax purposes. It is thus unclear 
whether the federal tax laws will afford same-sex couples all of the rights 
and obligations that would have attended their marriages had they remained 
domiciliaries of the state of celebration. This is just the type of uncertainty 
that the IRS guidance purports to eliminate when it eschews determining 
marital status based on domicile and instead applies the law of the place of 
celebration. The burden of grappling with the uncertainties raised by this 
lacuna will fall on same-sex couples, who will now require the aid of 
expensive tax lawyers and accountants to resolve these questions (if they 
 
61
  See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (LexisNexis 2006) (“Any child born to a married 
woman as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of her husband, shall be considered the 
legitimate child of the mother and such husband.”); see also Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601, 
602–03 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (finding that a lesbian couple who conceived through artificial 
insemination, married in the state, and then gave birth to a child in the same state, resulted in the child 
being a legitimate child of both parties). 
62
  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS: SECOND PARENT OR STEPPARENT ADOPTION 
(2013), available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/parenting_second-parent-adoption_ 
082013.pdf. 
63
  See I.R.C. §§ 152(a)(1), 267(b)(1), 267(c)(4), 318(a)(1); id. § 152(c) (Supp. 2012). 
64
  Id. § 2518(c)(3); H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 190–91, reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352, 392 (“Local 
law will be applicable to determine the identity of the transferee.”). 
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can be resolved at all). Again implicating the intersection of class with 
marital status, wealthier same-sex couples will be better positioned to seek 
this aid. The many same-sex couples who cannot afford expensive tax 
advice will be left to answer these questions themselves—or, more likely, 
they may simply throw up their hands in frustration. 
c. Traps for the unwary.—The IRS guidance also lays 
potentially dangerous traps for the unwary. For instance, the Supreme 
Court’s same-sex marriage decision renewed attention on the plight of 
married same-sex couples who split up in states that refuse to let them 
divorce.65 These couples have learned the hard way that many states 
recognizing same-sex marriage impose strict residency requirements for 
divorce, leaving them no legal way out of their marriages.66 For married 
same-sex couples in this situation, the IRS guidance raises difficult (and, for 
some, nearly insuperable) hurdles to severing their marital relationships for 
federal tax purposes. 
Under current tax law, the IRS cannot treat a couple as unmarried 
without state sanction. For filing purposes, a couple continues to be treated 
as married until a court issues a divorce or separation decree.67 Neither 
living apart nor signing a separation agreement will sever the marital 
relationship for this purpose.68 As a practical matter, this means that same-
sex couples who separate but cannot divorce must either file joint federal 
tax returns (and be on the hook for each other’s tax bills) or file as married 
filing separately. 
Married filing separately is not an attractive option, as evidenced by 
the very few taxpayers who choose this filing status.69 The married filing 
separately tax rates are higher than those for a joint return and, for some 
taxpayers, higher than those even for a single return.70 If one spouse filing 
separately itemizes deductions, then the other is denied the standard 
deduction.71 And married filing separately results in the reduction or 
complete denial of a variety of tax benefits, including the dependent care 
 
65
  E.g., Margaret Klaw, Gay Divorce, the Next Frontier, WASH. POST (July 5, 2013), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-05/opinions/40390073_1_marriage-equality-marriage-
license-marriage-act. 
66
  E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, §§ 4–5 (LexisNexis 2011). 
67
  See I.R.C. §§ 1, 2, 7703(a)(2). 
68
  BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS 
¶ 111.3.6 (2013) (“Since a decree is required, separation agreements do not terminate the marriage for 
tax purposes . . . .”). 
69
  I.R.S. Pub. No. 1304, Individual Income Tax Returns 2010, at 39–40 tbl.1.2 (2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10inalcr.pdf (indicating that, for taxable year 2010, the number of 
married filing jointly returns was 53,526,090 while the number of married filing separately returns was 
2,532,292). 
70
  See I.R.S., FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 79–91 (2012). 
71
  I.R.C. § 63(c)(6)(A). 
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assistance credit, adoption credit, earned income credit, and many tax 
benefits for education.72 
There is, however, a temporary reprieve for married individuals who 
occupy, maintain, and furnish more than half the cost of a household that 
their dependent child uses as a principal place of abode for more than half 
the year.73 These individuals can qualify for head of household filing status, 
but will return to married filing separately once the last child leaves home. 
Naturally, this reprieve is unavailable to same-sex couples without children 
or to the noncustodial spouse in a same-sex couple that does have children. 
Unless one of the former spouses meets the residency requirements of a 
state that will divorce them, this disadvantageous tax status will follow 
them until they die. 
d. Legal challenges.—The IRS guidance is likely to foster 
uncertainty by breeding litigation challenging its validity. Same-sex couples 
caught in the trap for the unwary described in the preceding section will 
have good reason to challenge the IRS guidance, as the alternative rule of 
determining marital status based on the couple’s domicile would, in many 
cases, effectively end the marital relationship for federal tax purposes by 
denying it legal recognition.74 But even more likely to spawn litigation is 
the IRS’s choice not to recognize civil unions and domestic partnerships 
that are the legal equivalent of marriage. 
Just two years ago, the IRS indicated that it was open to recognizing 
different-sex couples’ civil unions and domestic partnerships for federal tax 
purposes—so long as those relationships were the legal equivalent of 
marriage under state law.75 The letter conveying this position stated: 
 In general, the status of individuals of the opposite sex living in a 
relationship that the state would treat as husband and wife is, for Federal 
income tax purposes, that of husband and wife. . . . [T]he Illinois Religious 
Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act provides that “[A] party to a civil 
union is entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and 
benefits as are afforded or recognizes [sic] by the law of Illinois to 
spouses . . . .” Accordingly, if Illinois treats the parties to an Illinois civil union 
who are of opposite sex as husband and wife, they are considered “husband 
and wife” for purposes of Section 6013 of the Internal Revenue Code, and are 
 
72
  Id. §§ 21(e)(2), 23(f)(1), 25A(g)(6), 32(d), 221(e)(2). 
73
  Id. § 7703(b). 
74
  Alternatively, if a couple is party to an evasive marriage and the IRS ultimately takes the position 
that its guidance is intended to cover evasive marriages, then the couple might ask a state court to 
declare their marriage invalid and avoid the need to divorce altogether. See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
75
  Amy S. Elliott, IRS Memo Indicates Civil Unions Are Marriages for Tax Purposes, 133 TAX 
NOTES 794, 794 (2011). 
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not precluded from filing jointly, unless prohibited by other exceptions under 
the Code.76 
Some commentators expressed surprise at this position, believing that 
the most important factor in determining whether a couple is married for 
federal tax purposes is whether their legal relationship carries the marriage 
label under state law.77 In its post-Windsor guidance, the IRS reversed 
course and embraced the commentators’ view by exalting the importance of 
the marriage label and ignoring the legal equivalence of these relationships. 
With absolutely no analysis at all, the IRS concluded: 
 For Federal tax purposes, the terms “spouse,” “husband and wife,” 
“husband,” and “wife” do not include individuals (whether of the opposite sex 
or the same sex) who have entered into a registered domestic partnership, civil 
union, or other similar formal relationship recognized under state law that is 
not denominated as a marriage under the laws of that state, and the term 
“marriage” does not include such formal relationships.78 
It is this more recent position that is surprising, even a bit shocking. If 
any area of federal law were to recognize domestic partnerships and civil 
unions as marriages, one would expect it to be tax law because “[t]he 
principle of looking through form to substance . . . is the cornerstone of 
sound taxation.”79 Looking to substance rather than to form, domestic 
partnerships and civil unions that are marriages all but in name should be 
treated as marriages for federal tax purposes. What makes this position 
shocking is the comparative lack of analysis supporting it. The IRS’s post-
Windsor guidance is quite detailed—much more than is typical of a revenue 
ruling—and actually contains pages of analysis justifying the IRS’s 
decision to adopt a gender-neutral reading of the gendered terms husband 
and wife. The IRS went to great pains to explain why the labels husband 
and wife should not control the tax consequences of married same-sex 
couples but rather that it should be the equivalence of the legal relationships 
that controls. In contrast, the IRS’s position on civil unions and domestic 
partnerships is not the subject of similarly lengthy legal analysis; in fact, the 
IRS provides no legal analysis to support its position at all. 
Couples in civil unions and domestic partnerships are well-advised to 
contest the IRS’s change in its position. There is no tax policy justification 
for affording radically different tax treatment to couples who are in legally 
similar relationships (with the exception of the label applied to those 
 
76
  Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, Senior Technician Reviewer, I.R.S., to Robert Shair, Senior 
Tax Advisor, H&R Block (Aug. 30, 2011) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), 
available at http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/Documents/IRS-Letter-2011-on-Civil-Unions-in-
Illinois.pdf. 
77
  Elliott, supra note 75, at 794. 
78
  Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. 
79
  Estate of H.H. Weinert v. Comm’r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961). 
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relationships). The fact that the IRS made no attempt whatsoever to justify 
this distinction in treatment—other than to point to the importance of labels 
that it had just pages earlier argued do not matter—will only make this 
guidance all the more vulnerable when subject to legal challenge. 
By overriding the majority of states’ marriage laws, the IRS guidance 
is plagued by the same federalism concerns that made Section 3 of DOMA 
vulnerable to constitutional challenge.80 Although the states themselves may 
have trouble establishing standing to challenge the IRS guidance on 
federalism grounds,81 married same-sex couples caught in traps for the 
unwary and couples (same-sex or different-sex) in civil unions and 
domestic partnerships would have standing—and, more importantly, great 
incentive—to challenge the IRS’s position. The inevitable litigation 
challenging the validity of the IRS’s position will do nothing more than 
breed additional uncertainty regarding the tax treatment of same-sex 
couples post-Windsor. 
e. Interaction with state tax law.—The IRS guidance will also 
impose significant administrative and tax-filing burdens on married same-
sex couples in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage, just as 
Section 3 of DOMA did to same-sex couples in states that legally 
recognized their relationships. Pre-Windsor, same-sex couples whose 
relationships were legally recognized by a state were normally required to 
file two federal income tax returns using single or head of household 
status.82 However, on their state income tax returns, these couples usually 
could not file using single or head of household status.83 Because state 
income tax laws often piggyback on the federal income tax, this created a 
nonconformity of filing status (e.g., single or head of household at the 
federal level and married filing jointly or married filing separately at the 
state level). This noncomformity led to added complexity—and often added 
compliance burdens—for same-sex couples.84 For example, commentators 
predicted that “this nonconformity will produce higher tax preparation 
costs, higher state audit risks (when states are confused by differences on 
the state and federal returns), and more expense in dealing with state 
 
80
  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691–92 (2013); see supra notes 20 and 26, and 
accompanying text. 
81
  In contrast, Section 3 of DOMA clearly harmed states recognizing same-sex marriages, leading to 
a constitutional challenge by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
82
  Carlton Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with DOMA: Federal Non-Recognition Complicates 
State Income Taxation of Same-Sex Relationships, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 33 (2012). 
83
  Id. at 49–50. Colorado’s civil union regime is a notable exception to this general rule. COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 14-15-117 (2013). 
84
  Smith & Stein, supra note 82, at 49–81. 
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inquiries concerning conforming changes after federal audit changes have 
been made.”85 
Post-Windsor, the IRS’s approach to recognizing same-sex marriage 
creates a mirror image of this problem. With valid same-sex marriages 
recognized regardless of the law of the couple’s state of residence, same-sex 
couples living in states that do not recognize their marriages will be 
required to file as married filing jointly or married filing separately for 
federal purposes but will be prohibited from using those statuses when 
filing their state tax returns. This nonconformity will give rise to precisely 
the same complexity and administrative burden that existed pre-Windsor; it 
will just be a different group of same-sex couples that will be burdened 
(i.e., those who are already saddled with state nonrecognition of their 
relationships). 
f. Entrenching the privileging of marriage.—The IRS guidance 
also further entrenches the privileged status of marriage in the federal tax 
laws instead of fostering the recognition of a more diverse array of human 
relationships for federal tax purposes. Far from being marriage- or 
relationship-neutral, the Internal Revenue Code has been characterized as “a 
scheme of taxation where considerations of marital status are pervasive.”86 
Pre-Windsor, the federal tax laws recognized only different-sex marriages 
and traditional family structures built around different-sex married 
couples.87 
As described above,88 the IRS guidance takes a formalistic approach in 
determining which relationships merit recognition for federal tax purposes. 
According to the IRS, civil unions and domestic partnerships will not be 
recognized for federal tax purposes, even if they are the legal equivalent of 
a marriage. The IRS thus continues to confine the relationships that are 
recognized for tax purposes to marriage—and, now, only to marriage, 
without the possibility of recognizing any relationship that carries a 
different label. 
The IRS guidance effectively crowds out all other relationships and 
permits marriage to occupy the field. In the short term, this creates a strong 
incentive for couples in states with only civil unions or domestic 
partnerships to travel to one of the states that will allow them to marry, so 
long as that marriage will be valid and recognized for federal tax purposes. 
In the long term, it creates a strong incentive for civil union and domestic 
partnership states to abandon those relationship recognition regimes in 
 
85
  Id. at 34. 
86
  Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 132 
(1998). 
87
  Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Families, Tax Nothings, J. GENDER RACE & JUST. (forthcoming 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2231511. 
88
  See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
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favor of same-sex marriage. Moreover, any state that currently refuses to 
recognize same-sex relationships but later considers a change in its legal 
treatment of same-sex couples will choose to extend marriage to those 
couples rather than explore alternative options that might be afforded to all 
couples. For example, the District of Columbia currently provides couples 
the choice between registering as domestic partners with a more limited set 
of rights and obligations or to marry and have all of the rights and 
obligations of married spouses.89 In the future, states will be less likely to 
provide such different options for relationship recognition because the 
federal tax laws place a thumb firmly on the scales in favor of marriage. 
Had the IRS chosen to recognize domestic partnerships and civil 
unions that are the legal equivalent of marriage, it would have taken a step 
in the direction of loosening the grip that marriage has had on the federal 
tax laws. By opening the door to alternatives to marriage, the IRS could 
have laid the groundwork for eventually extending recognition to other 
relationships that entail the same type of entanglement as marriage but 
come with a more limited set of rights and obligations. For example, the 
IRS might eventually have acknowledged that couples in reciprocal 
beneficiary or designated beneficiary relationships make the same type of 
commitment that led policymakers to rely upon marital status as a factor in 
determining tax consequences. Instead, the IRS has chosen to ignore the 
commitments made by some while honoring the commitments made by 
others. This could result in adverse tax consequences for some and tax 
benefits for others that are wholly unrelated to any tax policy justification 
and are driven only by the choice to privilege marriage—and only 
marriage—in the federal tax laws. 
There is also reason to be concerned about the intersection of this 
privileging of marriage with class (as well as race and gender)—a problem 
highlighted at several points above.90 Income inequality in the United States 
has been growing over the past several decades. Economists Anthony 
Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez have shown that the share 
of income going to the top 10% of the population in the United States has 
significantly spiked since the 1970s.91 Research in the area of income 
inequality has now begun to focus on how changes in family structure and 
 
89
  Prior to permitting same-sex couples to marry, the District of Columbia permitted them to enter 
into domestic partnerships that afforded more limited rights and obligations. E.g., D.C. CODE §§ 32-701 
to -710 (LexisNexis 2001). Even after the extension of marriage to same-sex couples, couples still have 
the option of entering into a domestic partnership. Id. §§ 32-701, -702(d)(3), (i), (j). 
90
  See supra Part II.B. 
91
  See Anthony B. Atkinson et al., Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 3, 6 (2011). The share of total income going to the top 10% reached nearly 50% by 2007, 
which is “the highest level on record.” Id. Most of this change benefited the top 1%, which saw its share 
of income increase “from 8.9 percent in 1976 to 23.5 percent in 2007.” Id. The top 0.1% has done even 
better, with its share of income having “more than quadrupled from 2.6 percent to 12.3 percent over this 
period.” Id. 
108:110 (2013) The Moonscape of Tax Equality 
 128 
composition affect income inequality and also have negative impacts along 
lines of race and gender.92 Indeed, a review of this literature points to the 
division of marriage along class lines (with decreases in marriage 
concentrated at lower income levels) and concludes that “[t]here is strong 
support for the hypothesis that increases in single mother families and 
decreases in married couple families have increased income inequality.”93 
Or, as the popular press has summed it up: “[S]triking changes in family 
structure have also broadened income gaps and posed new barriers to 
upward mobility. . . . [M]otherhood outside marriage now varies by class 
about as much as it does by race,” and “marriage and its rewards [are] 
evermore confined to the fortunate classes.”94 To the extent that there is an 
association between marriage and growing income inequality, further 
entrenching the privileged status of marriage in the tax laws—which are 
often viewed as one of the primary tools for reducing income inequality—
may only exacerbate income inequality along lines of class, race, and 
gender. 
In light of the numerous problems associated with the IRS’s 
implementation of the Windsor decision, we should take this opportunity to 
pause and consider more fundamental reforms of the tax system—ones that 
might both better address these problems and improve the tax system for 
everyone. So long as the patchwork of legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships continues among the states, the IRS is going to find it 
impossible to come up with a workable and fair solution for addressing the 
tax treatment of same-sex couples. With this future in mind, it is worth 
recalling that commentators have for decades been leveling devastating 
critiques at the choice to adopt the married couple as a taxable unit.95 This 
literature suggests an easier and fairer approach than that adopted by the 
IRS—one that would address the plight of same-sex couples and improve 
the overall fairness of the federal tax system. Under this approach, we 
would eliminate the privileging of marriage in the federal tax laws by 
adopting the individual as the taxable unit. This approach avoids the need to 
determine when and how to take same-sex marriage into account for federal 
tax purposes. It also holds the promise of a relationship-neutral tax system 
that could recognize a wide array of human relationships. Indeed, I have 
elsewhere outlined a proposal for individual income tax filing that is 
designed to recognize all economically interdependent relationships for tax 
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  See, e.g., Sarah McLanahan & Christine Percheski, Family Structure and the Reproduction of 
Inequalities, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 257, 269–71 (2008); Molly A. Martin, Family Structure and Income 
Inequality in Families with Children, 1976 to 2000, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 421, 436–39 (2006). 
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  Leslie McCall & Christine Percheski, Income Inequality: New Trends and Research Directions, 
36 ANN. REV. SOC. 329, 335, 337 (2010). 
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  Jason DeParle, Two Classes, Divided by “I Do,” N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012), 
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purposes and not just those patterned after marriage or even those that are 
conjugal in nature.96 The time is ripe to revisit such proposals and to 
seriously consider their adoption. 
CONCLUSION 
Appearances can be deceiving. Just as the moon is not simply shiny 
and bright but also pocked with the evidence of prior violent impacts, the 
tax “equality” that same-sex couples have achieved with the invalidation of 
Section 3 of DOMA seems appealing but is actually a terrain fraught with 
the effects of prior discrimination and filled with new pitfalls for same-sex 
couples and adverse effects on others. In fact, it is only after having attained 
this “equal” status that the real work of achieving equal treatment for all—
whether married or not—begins. 
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  Id. at 638–63. 
